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COMMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE -

COMPENSATION OF WITNESSES IN A CIVIL

AoTION-As the amount and complexity of litigation has increased,
there have been corresponding increases in demands for added compensation of witnesses. Like the juror, the witness often receives the
time-honored answer that he cannot be heard to complain that his
compensation is inadequate; the administration of justice is a mutual
benefit to all members of the community, and each is under a public
duty to further it
At common law witnesses received no compensation.1 Time spent
in testifying was held to be claimed by the public as a tax, paid by
the witness to the system of law which protected the rights of all. 2
Statutory provisions gradually were enacted, providing for various
degrees o~ compensation.3 Today, there are such statutory provisions
in every state as well as in the federal courts. The area is fraught with
controversies and bears examination.

I. The Ordinary Witness
The ordinary witness is one who has personal lmowledge of matters
of fact pertaining to the case; on the witness stand he relates these
facts. This is in contrast to the expert, who primarily gives opinion
concerning the significance of facts. In general, the compensation of
the ordinary witness includes a specified amount per day plus an additional mileage fee. Per diem rates range from 50 cents in Connecticut,4
New Jersey,5 and Virginia6 to six dollars in Utah. 7 Several states have
1 39 L.R.A. 116 (1898).
2 Blair v. United States, 250

U.S. 273, 39 S.Ct. 468 (1919).
5 Eliz., c. 9, §12 (1562), providing for compensation " .. . according to his or their
countenance or calling such reasonable sum of money for his or their costs and cbar?es, as
having regard to the distance of the places is necessary to be allowed in that behalf.'
4 Conn. Stat. (1949) §3611.
5 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 22, c. 1, §4.
6 Va. Code (1950) §14-187.
7 Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 21, c. 5, §4. Other statutes provide the following per
diem rates: 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1821: $4; Ala. Code (1940) tit. 11, §44: $1.50;
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §34-131: $1.50; Ark. Stat. (1947) §28.524: $1.50; Del. Code
(1935) c. 156, §19: $2; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) tit. 7, §90.14: $2; Ga. Code Ann. (1949)
8
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a special rate for half days. 8 Fees depend on the class of county in
Colorado,9 while North Carolina declares that the county board of
commissioners shall :6x compensation within a range of one to three
dollars per day, but if the witness attends a trial outside of his county
of residence, the statute specifies the rate. 10 Generally, the fees of
voluntary witnesses are allowed as costs, regardless of whether they
come from beyond the reach of subpoena,11 but some courts limit costs
to subpoenaed witnesses. 12 In New York, the Civil Practice Act specifies that a witness will get one dollar per day, if subpoenaed; otherwise,
he will receive 50 cents.13 California is the only state in which the
statute declares that the state may require the services of witnesses,
with or without compensation.14 In general, where testimony is worthless and in substance inadmissible, no fees are taxed in costs.15 If a
subpoenaed witness attends and is deemed necessary to an issue presented and then the issue is abandoned and the witness is not sworn
because of this, compensation is nevertheless customarily allowed. 16
However, a party cannot call an unnecessary number of witnesses and
the court can exercise discretion as to the number of witnesses for
which the prevailing party shall be allowed to tax costs.17
Reimbursement for mileage traveled also varies greatly. Georgia
offers none,1 8 whereas Idaho gives an allowance of 25 cents per mile for
§1501: 75 cents; Idaho Code Ann. (1948) tit. 9, §1601: $3; ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd,
1951) c. 53, §65: $1; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1946 Replacement) §2.1710: $1.25; Iowa
Code Ann. (1946) §622.69: $2; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §28-125: $1.50; Ky. Stat.
(1948) tit. 38, §421.010: $1; La. Rev. Stat. (Dart, 1950) §13.3661: $1.50; Me. Rev.
Stat. (1944) c. 100, §129: $2; Md. Code Ann. (1951) art. 35, §16: $1; Mass. Laws Ann.
(1952 Supp.) c. 262, §29: $3; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §357.22: $1; Miss. Code Ann.
(1942) §3953: $1.50; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) tit. 25, §404: $3; Neb. Rev. Stat.
(1943, reissue, 1952) §33-139: $2; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1931-1941) §8490: $2;
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 392, §16: $3; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §31-0116: $2; Ohio
Rev. Code (1953) §2335.06: $1; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 28, §81: $1; Ore. Comp. Laws
Ann. (1940) §87-961: $2; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952 Supp.) tit. 28, §416.2: $3; R.I.
Acts and Resolves (1939) c. 715, §7: $1.50; S.C. Code (1952) §27-603: $1; S.D. Code
(1939) §36.0401: $2; Tenn. Code Ann. (1934) §9799: l; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
(Vernon, 1925) art. 3708: $1; Vt. Stat. (1947) §10,522: $2.50; Wash. Rev. Code (1951)
§2.40.010: $4; W.Va. Code (1949) §5833: $1; Wis. Stat. (1951) §325.05: $5.
81\1ich. Stat. Ann. (1951 Supp.) §27.2557: $5 per day and $2.50 per half day; Wyo.
Stat. Ann. (1945) §3-3701: $2 per day and $1.50 per half day.
o Colo. Stat. (1935) c. 66, §46. Range is from $1.50 to $2.50 per day.
10 N.C. Stat. (1953) §6-52.
11 Marks v. Merrill Paper Co., (7th Cir. 1913) 203 F. 16.
12 Lillienthal v. So. Cal. Ry. Co., (D.C. Cal. 1894) 61 F. 622.
13 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) §1539.
14 Cal. Govt. Code (Deering, 1951) tit. 1, §204.
15Wollenberger v. Hoover, 346 ill. 511, 179 N.E. 42 (1931).
16 Jones v. Antrim Circuit Judge, 223 Mich. 141, 193 N.W. 873 (1923).
17 Kane v. Luckman, (D.C. Iowa 1904) 131 F. 609.
18 Ga. Code (1949) §1501. But in Dickerson v. Mangham, 194 Ga. 466, 22 S.E.
(2d) 88 (1942), the court stated that disinterested witnesses should be compensated for
travel time and expense.
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the distance one way between the place of residence of the witness and
the place of trial.1 9 The majority of statutes base the mileage rate on
a to-and-from computation, with the most usual figure being that of
five cents per mile. 20 Ordinarily, mileage out of the state is not taxable. 21 For travel in the state, mileage is normally allowed in taxing
costs, whether or not the witness is subpoenaed.22 However, some
states either by judicial limitation23 or by statute24 have established
otherwise. North Carolina specifies that the county board of commissioners £x the rate, within a maximum of five cents per mile on a round
trip basis.25 In Maryland, mileage allowance depends on the county.26
A few jurisdictions do not allow any mileage at all within a specified
radius of the place of trial, usually less than twenty miles. 27 In the
19 Idaho Code Ann. (1948) tit. 9, §1601.
20 The following compensation rates are on

a per mile basis (asterisks denote payment
for one way only): 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1821: seven cents; Ala. Code (1940)
tit. 11, §44: five cents; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §34-131: fifteen cents*; Colo. Stat. (1935)
c. 66, §47: fifteen cents*; Del. Code (1935) c. 156, §19: three cents; Fla. Stat. Ann.
(1943) §90.14: five cents; ID. Stat. Ann. (1951) c. 53, §65: five cents; Iowa Code Ann.
(1946) §622.69: fiye cents; Kan. Stat. Ann. (1949) §28-125: five cents; La. Rev. Stat.
(Dart, 1950) §13.3661: five cents; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 100, §129: six cents; Mass.
Laws Ann. (1952 Supp.) c. 262, §29: five cents; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1951 Supp.) §27.2557:
ten cents*; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §257.22: six cents; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §3953:
five cents; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §491.280: five cents; Mont. Rev. Code Ann.
(1947) tit. 25, §404: seven cents; Neb. Stat. (1943, reissue 1952) §33-139: five cents;
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1931-1941) §8490: fifteen cents*; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit.
22, c. 1, §4: one dollar "for every thirty miles from and to his or her place of residence";
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §20-104: five cents; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §31-0116: ten
cents; Ohio Rev. Code (1953) §2335.06: five cents; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 28, §81: five
cents; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §87-964, as amended Ore. Laws 1949: eight cents;
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952 Supp.) tit. 28, §416.4: five cents; R.I. Acts and Resolves
(1939) c. 715, §7: ten cents; S.C. Code (1952) §27-603: five cents; S.D. Code (1939)
§36.0401: ten cents*; Tenn. Code Ann. (1934) §9799: four cents; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3708: six cents; Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 21, c. 5, §4:
twenty cents*; Vt. Stat. (1947) §10,522: six cents; Wash. Rev. Code (1951) §2.04.010:
ten cents; W.Va. Code (1949) §5833: five cents; Wis. Stat. (1951) §325.05: five cents;
Wyo. Stat. Ann. (1945) §3-3701: ten cents.
21 Woodard v. Chicago, R.I. and Pac. Ry. Co., 193 Iowa 516, 185 N.W. 978 (1921).
22 In re Estate of Hnlme, 185 Iowa 1219, 171 N.W. 599 (1919).
23 Daloia v. Boyd, 16 Wash. (2d) 439, 133 P. (2d) 950 (1943); Barber v. Parsons,
145 Mass. 203, 13 N.E. 491 (1887) (travel fees taxed only when witness is summoned).
24Ark. Stat. (1947) §§28.526, 28.527: no mileage to persons within the county where
the trial is being held. Five cents per mile to attend outside the county of the witness'
residence. But see Ind. Stat. Ann. (1946 Replacement) §1710: five cents per mile both
ways "not to be computed beyond the limits of adjoining county."
25 N.C. Stat. (1953) §6-52.
26 Md. Code Ann. (1951) art. 35, §16: mileage depends on the county, ranging from
"itinerant" charges to ten cents per mile based on the witness' distance from the county seat.
27 Ky. Stat. (1948) §421.010: four cents per mile going and returning, when tlie witness resides more than twenty miles away; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 392, §16: six cents
per mile each way where the witness has to leave the town· or city in which he resides in
order to testify; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) §1539: eight cents per mile one
way if the witness lives more than three miles from the trial; Va. Code (1950) §14-187:
four cents per mile to and from point "beyond ten miles necessarily traveled to the place
of attendance."
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federal courts, a few cases allow costs for the entire mileage of witnesses, regardless of the distance traveled or the fact that the witnesses
might come from outside the district or state.28 But the great majority
of decisions hold that mileage fees are taxable only as far as the
subpoena will run.29
From all of this data one conclusion is obvious: the witness will
usually be attending a trial at a financial sacrifice. This is especially
true if he lives comparatively far from the place of trial and is forced
to stay overnight. Several states have attempted to alleviate this situation by providing for special allowances for overnight shelter and extra
meal expense.30 A provision in Missouri allows the witness an additional sum if he testifies outside the county of his residence. 31 All of
these problems are magnified when the person testifying is an "expert."

II. The Expert Witness
Correlative with the increasing complexity of society has been a
greater complexity in litigations, entailing more and more testimony of
a technical character. This has resulted in great pressure to furnish
added compensation for expert witnesses. Generally, a witness having
personal knowledge is required to attend court without pay other than
that provided by statute.32 He may be required to testify regarding
matters within his knowledge, even though he has obtained superior
knowledge through experience and special training.33 For instance, a
doctor who witnesses an accident and renders first aid must testify as
to the condition of the person injured; he is not entitled to demand
extra compensation because he is more qualified than the layman to
testify on such matters. 34
•
But when a person not directly connected with the facts of a case
gives testimony of a technical character, the real problem of added
compensation for experts comes into focus. The expert can be best
28 Morris-Turner Live Stock Co. v. Director General of Railroads, (D.C. Mont. 1920)
266 F. 600.
20 Friedman v. Washburn Co., (7th Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 959.
30 La. Rev. Stat. (Dart, 1950) §13.3661: a person resicfing outside of the parish
wherein the case is pending who is required to stay overnight is allowed $3.50 for hotel
and meal expense; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952 Supp.) tit. 28, §416.6: where witness
resides more than fifty miles from the proceeding and is necessarily absent from one day to
the next, $3 per night for lodging.
31 Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §491.280: $1.50 per day in the county of the
witness' residence, and $2 per day outside the county; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §20-104:
$1 per day in the county of the witness' residence, and $2 per day outside of the county.
But see Indiana statute, note 24 supra.
32 McClenahan v. Keyes, 188 Cal. 574, 206 P. 454 (1922).
33 Dixon v. People, 168 ID. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897).
34 Burnett v. Freeman, 125 Mo. App. 683, 103 S.W. 121 (1907).
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defined as "
a witness otherwise unconnected with the case who
because of his . . . special qualifications is called to give in evidence
his expert opinion, either based on facts, or on the result of examination
of material or data, submitted to him for the purpose."35 In dealing
with these problems, there appear to be four categorical approaches.
(I) The expert is compensated as an ordinary witness. Any additional
compensation must be paid by the party calling the witness. This is
by far the majority approach. 36 (2) The expert is compensated as an
ordinary witness, and a contract for any additional compensation is
void for want of consideration37 or illegal.38 Making such added compensation illegal has little effect, for the statute can be readily circumvented through the device of consultation fees. (3) Several statutes
specifically allow additional compensation for experts, some limiting
35

111 J.P. 144 (1947).

36Alabama: An expert "may be compelled to . . . testify ••• without . . . tender of

compensation other than the per diem and mileage allowed to [ordinary] witnesses." Ala.
Code (1940) tit. 7, §366. Contract for additional compensation is valid. Hartley v.
Alabama Nat. Bank, 247 Ala. 651, 25 S. (2d) 680 (1946). Arkansas: An expert cannot
demand extra compensation. Flinn v. Prairie County, 60 Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459 (1895).
Georgia: An expert subpoenaed is not entitled to more fees than an ordinary witness.
Schofield v. Little, 2 Ga. App. 286, 58 S.E. 666 (1907). Illinois: Expert witnesses are in
the same position as others with respect to their fees. Commissioners of Lincoln Park v.
Schmidt, 395 ill. 316, 69 N.E. (2d) 689 (1946). Indiana: An expert can be compelled
to testify "in relation to any matter, whenever such opinion is material evidence relevant
to an issue on trial . . . without compensation other than [that] allowed by law." Ind.
Stat. 4nn. (1946 Replacement) §2.1722. Persons who have experience in any particular
business may be called as experts. Fort Wayne v. Coombs, 107 Ind. 75, 7 N.E. 743 (1886).
Kentucky: An expert may be subpoenaed and required to attend without the guarantee of
any compensation over and above the statutory witness fee. Sanders v. Commonwealth,
291 Ky. 216, 163 S.W. (2d) 493 (1942). Missouri: Contract to pay expert more is not
invalid as against "public policy." Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 348 Mo.
1032, 156 S.W. (2d) 597 (1941). New York: Fees for experts in excess of regular statutory amount must be borne by the party calling the expert. In re Greco's Estate, 190 Misc.
769, 78 N.Y.S. (2d) 429 (1947). Pennsylvania: Expert can receive additional compensation, but it shall not be taxable as costs. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952 Supp.) tit. 28,
§416.9. See Lance v. Luzerne County Mfrs. Assn., 366 Pa. 398, 77 A. (2d) 386 (1951).
Texas: Plaintiff not entitled to recover for fees paid in obtaining expert testimony. Gulf,
C. and S.F. Ry. Co. v. Dooley, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 345, 131 S.W. 831 (1910). West
Virginia: An expert "\vitness may be compelled to testify as to matters of professional opinion
or as to special knowledge gained by reason of his professional training or experience without a fee other than that of an ordinary witness. Ealy v. Shetler Ice Cream Co., 108 W.Va.
184, 150 S.E. 539 (1929). United States: Additional amounts paid to expert witnesses
cannot be allowed as costs in the federal courts. Henkel v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. and 0.
Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 444, 52 S.Ct. 223 (1932).
37 Connecticut: Agreement to pay witness more than legal fees will not ordinarily be
enforced; exceptional cases will be considered. Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463 (1857).
38 Michigan: No expert witness shall receive a sum in excess of ordinary witness fee
unless court awards a larger sum. Any witness who directly or indirectly receives a larger
sum and any person paying such sum shall be guilty of contempt of court. Mich. Stat.
Ann. (1951 Supp.) §27.918. Nebraska: A special contract to pay more than the regular
witness fee is illegal and void. State v. First Bank of Nickerson, 114 Neb. 423, 207 N.W.
674 (1926).
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it to a certain maximum amount:3 9 and others leaving the payment to
the discretion of the court. 40 Additional compensation can be paid,
though the person also testifies to facts of the case as an ordinary
witness,41 but there is disagreement as to whether he has to be called
as an expert in order to receive added fees. 42 ( 4) Finally, California
permits added compensation for experts appointed by the court.43 It
is generally agreed in all jurisdictions that the expert can recover fees
for work involved in rendering an opinion from the party for whom
the work is performed;44 a very common example is a chemical analysis
done upon request.
Various policy considerations have been offered to support or controvert added compensation. It has been argued that the expert's time
is especially valuable to him. 45 However, the hardship is relatively no
3 9 Florida: Expert allowed reasonable amount "not in excess of ten dollars per hour
from time of reporting to place of trial until conclusion of his testimony." Fla. Stat. Ann.
(1943) as amended 1949, §90.231. The judge shall determine the amount, and it shall
be taxed as costs. See Daytona Beach v. Humphreys, (Fla. 1951) 53 S. (2d) 871. Iowa:
Expert witnesses "shall receive additional compensation, to be fixed by the court, with
reference to the value of the time employed and the degree of learning or skill required;
but such additional compensation shall not exceed four dollars per day. . • ." Iowa Code
Ann. (1946) §622.72. Maine: " ••• The court in its discretion, may allow •.• a sum not
exceeding $25 per day for the attendance of any expert witness. • . ." Me. Rev. Stat.
(1944) c. 100, §129.
40 Colorado: Courts may allow experts amounts which the courts deem proper. Denver
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Board of County Comrs., 105 Colo. 366, 98 P. (2d) 283 (1940).
Delaware: Fees of experts fixed by court in its discretion and taxed as part of the costs.
Del. Code (1935) c. 129, §21. Louisiana: Expert witnesses "shall receive additional
compensation, to be fixed by the court, with reference to the value of the time employed
and the degree of learning or skill required." La. Rev. Stat. (Dart, 1950) §13.3666.
Court can restrain litigant where he attempts to summon uselessly a number of expert
witnesses. Stem v. Lanng, 106 La. 738, 31 S. 303 (1901). For taxing as costs, see Levy
v. McWilliams, 13 La. App. 444, 129 S. 170 (1930). Michigan: See note 38 supra. $50
per day fee allowed in Security Life Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 221 Mich. 496, 191 N.W. 216
(1922). Minnesota: Judge of any court of record may allow expert "such fees or compensation as, in his judgment, may be just and reasonable." Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947)
§357.25. See Le Mere v. McHale, 30 Minn. 410, 15 N.W. 682 (1883), for construction
of "expert." See also 14 MrnN. L. REv. 432 (1930). North Carolina: ''Experts, when
compelled to attend and testify, shall be allowed such compensation and mileage as the
court may in its discretion order." N.C. Stat. (1953) §6-52. See Connor v. Hayworth &
Cole, 206 N.C. 721, 175 S.E. 140 (1934). Vermont: "In state causes extra compensation
may be allowed to expert witnesses" when so ordered by the court; "compensation will be
fixed by the court before whom the trial is had." Vt. Stat. (1947) §10,524.
41 Attrep v. Horecky, (La. App. 1937) 177 S. 379.
42 Must be called as expert: Snyder v. Iowa City, 40 Iowa 646 (1875). Contra:
Suthon v. Laws, 132 La. 207, 61 S. 204 (1913).
43 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949) tit. 1, §1871. Court can appoint one or more
experts, on motion of either party or of the court. Court fixes compensation, if any, and
charges to parties in such portion as court shall determine and it may thereafter be taxed
and allowed in like manner as other costs. Experts produced by parties shall be entitled
only to ordinary witness fees, which shall be taxed as other witness fees.
44 Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909); 8 W1GMORE,
EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2203 (1940).
45 Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877).
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greater on the expert than on the ordinary person; each loses a day's
labor. Sometimes a constitutional argument is made that the knowledge of the expert is his property and that taking it without just compensation violates due process under the federal and most state constitutions; there is a benefit conferred for which there should be
payment.46 This presupposes that opinion is property, a concept that
seems tenuous at best. A more cogent reason for paying the expert
added compensation is that otherwise there will be too great a burden
on well-known men in their respective fields. 47 This argument is in
part rebutted by the fact that since an overburdened expert is likely to
be disgruntled, litigants will be cautious in asking such persons to
testify. Finally, it has been argued that the opinion of the expert is
his means of livelihood, and he should not Be compelled to contribute
it. 48 Stryker has said, "The physician has as much right to be compensated for his store of goods, namely, his knowledge, as has the
grocer for his cans of tomatoes or his green vegetables on his shelves."40
Opponents of added compensation contend that it is difficult to
distinguish opinion from fact; some say opinion is fact for the consideration of the court, whereas others say facts are opinions of witnesses as to circumstances.50 Another difficulty often mentioned is
fixing a scale of pay for various experts. England has such a scale,
which has been much criticized,51 but this matter has not confronted
American courts, for additional compensation where allowed is usually
at the discretion of the court.52 It is also argued that though the person
calling the expert may realize benefit from his . knowledge without
paying for it, the primary benefit is in the betterment of judicial administration.53 This suggests again the basis of all arguments against
extra compensation for expert witnesses: the administration of justice
is a mutual benefit to all members of the community, and each individual is under a public duty to give the best testimony possible to
further justice.54
46 Pennsylvania Company v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918).
47 Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877).
48 United States v. Cooper, 21 D.C. 491 (1893).
49 STRYKER, CouRTS AND DOCTORS 166 (1932).
50 See 50 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 346 (1902).
51See 111 J.P. 144 (1947); 112 J.P. 600 (1948). See also, Mitchell, "Witnesses'
Expenses," 23 N.Z.L.J. 166 (1947).
52 See notes 39 and 40 supra.
53 Dixon v. People, 168 ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897).
54 See 8 WrnMoBE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2203 (1940); Philler v. Waukesha County,
139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909).
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However, this does not meet the problem of the "professional"
witness, who in the ordinary practice of his profession acquires knowledge of the facts of the case before the court and is called upon to give
evidence as to these facts or to express an opinion based on his general
professional knowledge and experience. Nor does it adequately rebut
the argument that knowledge is the stock in trade of the expert, which,
it is contended, no litigant should obtain without reasonable compensation.
One solution to this dilemma has been the making of compensation contracts between a litigant and his expert witness. In some states
such contracts are illegal. 55 A great many more hold that since a witness owes a legal duty to testify, these contracts are unenforceable
because the performance of a legal duty is not consideration.56 However, this would not apply where the witness is in another state or is
privileged.57 But as already shown, a great many states do allow the
making of such contracts. 58 The expert does not owe a legal duty to
give more than facts observed, so it would seem that a contract for
expert testimony is not against public policy. 59 Contingent contracts
in preparing evidence, however, have been in large part condemned
on the basis that they breed perjury and fabrication. 60 On the other
hand, it has been contended that there is no reason to strike down such
agreements where there is no evidence of abuse, and that they greatly
aid the poor man who ordinarily could not afford an expert's services. 61
In this entire area, it is unfortunate that statutes either giving or
allowing extra fees seem to be directed solely toward protecting the
expert by providing him with adequate compensation. The approach
should rather consider the judicial system as a whole, with two major
problems in mind: (I) should any additional compensation be paid
at all? and (2) if paid, should such compensation be taxed as costs?
From the standpoint of sound judicial administration, there· are
several strong reasons why the expert should not receive additional
Note 38 supra.
See note 37 supra; Klepper v. Klepper, 199 Mo. App. 294, 202 S.W. 593 (1918).
57 16 A.L.R. 1442 (1922).
58 Note 36 supra.
59 Stanton v. Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A. 721 (1934). But see Philler v.
Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909) (a witness may be required to
give testimony as to his professional opinion).
60 Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 130 N.W. 667 (1911). Agreements making
fee contingent on result of litigation are void. Pelkey v. Hodge, 112 Cal. App. 424, 296
P. 908 (1931).
61 Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W. (2d) 597
(1941).
55
56
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compensation. Because he is selected, compensated, and coached by
one party, the expert witness may not be sufficiently unbiased and
disinterested. On this basis, the whole idea of expert testimony has
been severely criticized. 62 Another criticism is that unlimited expert
testimony is economically unjust because it favors the wealthy litigant. 63
It seems appropriate, then, that in any statutory scheme allowing individuals to pay experts additional compensation, courts should have
some supervision over the amount. One suggestion is to have the court
approve the fee of the expert before testimony is admitted. This would
result in less inequality arising from differences in economic status and
might have the effect of encouraging more objective testimony. But
there will still be partisanship in favor of the person paying the fee.
Such bias is not necessarily based on the idea of selling to the highest
bidder; more likely, it stems from natural feelings of loyalty tq the
person paying the bill, plus the witness' desire that his benefactor "get
.
,
th,,
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A solution to these problems has been proposed by writers urging
that experts be compensated entirely by the state. 64 This presents the
second issue of whether compensation paid should be taxed as costs.
Absent statutes, there is generally no taxing as costs because the expert
can sell his services and cannot by law be required to testify as an
expert in most jurisdictions allowing extra compensation. 65 Even
though experts were to be limited on each side, the cost of litigation
would nevertheless be substantially increased, especially considering
estimates so often given that over sixty percent of all cases require
expert testimony. 66 Because of the additional state expense, some
writers take a limited view of state compensation, believing that only
in the case of court-appointed experts should the state pay more than
ordinary fees. This cuts the cost for the state, yet assures both parties
of the availability of expert testimony, regardless of £nancial means.
The American Law Institute has proposed this procedure:
"The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the
judge shall be :fixed at a reasonable amount. ... In a civil action
it shall be paid as the judge shall order; he may order that it be
See 38 CoL. L. RBv. 369 (1938).
1 TEX. LAW AND LEGIS. 100 (1947).
See 12 A.B.A.J. 150 (1926); Friedman, ''Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and
Reformation," 19 YALE L.J. 247 (1910).
65 Note 36 SUJ2ra.
See also Cheatham Electric Switching Device Co. v. Transit
Development Co., (.2d Cir. 1919) 261 F. 792; 16 A.L.R. 1442 (.1922).
66 WELLMAN, A:!i.T OF Cnoss ExAM:l:NATION, 4th ed., 76 (1936); Hamo, "Uniform
Expert Testimony Act," 21 J. AM.. JUD. Soc. 156 (1938).
62
63
64
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paid by the parties in such proportions and at such times as he
shall prescribe, or that the proportion of any party be paid by
[insert name of the proper authority], and that, after payment by
the parties or [insert name of the public authority] or both, all or
part or none of it be taxed as costs in the public action. Any witness appointed by the judge who receives any compensation other
than that fu:ed by the judge and any person who pays or offers or
promises to pay such other compensation shall be guilty of contempt of court. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but
not appointed by the judge shall be paid by the party calling him
but shall not be taxed as costs in the action."67
California has an analogous provision in its statutes, with the added
proviso that the court before or during the trial may limit the number
of witnesses to be called by any party.68 In theory this seems to be a
very good compromise plan; however, its practicality is questionable in
that there is the complex problem of which experts the court will
appoint and upon whose recommendation the court will choose. If the
court appoints experts recommended by both sides, the dilemma of
excessive litigation costs arises. The calling of many expert witnesses
might make litigation so expensive that valid causes of action are
frustrated. However, if a statute is to authorize the taxing of expert
fees as costs, it seems fair that the court should have some supervision
over the amount.
This leads into a possible middle ground of achieving independence
of expert witnesses and yet not burdening the state with excessive fees.
Interrogatories and answers or depositions taken pursuant to commission could be admitted, regardless of the presence of the witness within
the range of process of the court. Costs would be cut down and in
addition the expert would not be losing much time in traveling to the
trial and testifying in person, for the interrogatories and depositions
could be taken at his convenience. Unfortunately, the practicality of
this solution is limited, for it is generally agreed that no matter how
carefully a judge instructs a jury, interrogatories and depositions do
not carry as much weight with the jury as actual witnesses.

III. Conclusion
There is no complete solution to the difficulties involved in compensation of witnesses. The central problem is one of balance; litiga67 A.L.I. MoDEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE,
68

Rule 410 (1942).
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949) tit. 1, §1871. See note 43 supra.
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tion costs should not be so cheap that there is no deterrent to frivolous
actions and yet costs should not be so ex<;:essive that valid causes of
action are frustrated because expert testimony requires increased .financing. In addition there must be considered the problems of economic
inequality, the burdens on persons well known in their professions, and
the fact that knowledge is the "stock in trade" of the expert. Finally,
it is important to encourage impartiality of the expert.
It is generally agreed that the expert should at least receive pay for
preliminary work undertaken in order to give opinion. 69 This is only
fair; otherwise it would be impossible to get much work of this kind
done. It is the opinion of this writer that courts should have some
supervision over the payment of extra compensation by the individual
parties; this would counter differences in economic status and offset
the natural bias of the expert toward his employer. As to the extent
of supervision, the availability of consultation fee agreements is a
limiting factor. Although the scheme of state appointed experts has
recently received wide attention, it is laden with difficulties of choosing
and appointing such experts.
All proposals for added fees for experts are confronted with the
basic philosophy of the American judicial system that the administration of justice is a mutual benefit to all members of the community and
each individual is under a public duty to give the best testimony possible to further justice. Although there are economic inequalities in
allowing private parties to hire their own experts, this argument has
had somewhat less validity as the general standard of living has risen.
Opening the door for the taxing of expert fees as part of costs can result
in an intolerable increase in the cost of litigation. If there is any
increase at all, it should be uniform for all witnesses. By and large,
statutes now in force allow ordinary witnesses' fees on a scale of .fifty
or seventy-five years ago. The value of the dollar has changed so that
these fees are in reality nominal. It is in this area that the most effective pressure can be exerted for increasing compensation for witnesses.
But to yield to demands for increasing the fees given for expert testimony opens the door to manifold problems.

David W. Belin, S.Ed.

69 Philler
EVIDENCE, 3d

v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909); 8 W1GMORE,
ed., §2203 (1940).

